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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The United States District Court for the District of the State
of New Union entered a final judgment that addressed all parties'
claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Cir-
cuit has jurisdiction over this appeal in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§1291.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the district court erred in granting the State of
New Union's motion to intervene under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2),
which permits the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency to intervene but makes no mention of intervention by the
States.
2. Whether the district court correctly granted summary
judgment for Capitol City because it lacked jurisdiction over the
case as a result of plaintiffs failure to give adequate notice as re-
quired by 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b).
3. Whether the District Court correctly granted summary
judgment, holding that Capitol City's diversion of the waters of
the Torpid River to the Rapid River without a permit issued under
33 U.S.C. § 1342 did not constitute a violation of 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a).
4. Whether the District Court properly granted summary
judgment, holding that New Union's granting of a permit for Capi-
tol City's diversion of the Torpid River to the Rapid River as part
of the State's control over water ownership, use, and allocation ob-
viated application of the federal Clean Water Act to this diversion.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Friends of the South Slope Cutthroat, Inc. ("FSSC")
brought suit against Capitol City, New Union, pursuant to the cit-
izen suit provision of the Clean Water Act ("CWA" or "Act"), 33
U.S.C. § 1251, 1365. R. at 3. FSSC complains that Capitol City
violates § 1311(a) of the Act, which forbids the addition of a pollu-
tant to navigable water without a permit. Id. Specifically, FSSC
contends that Capitol City violates the Act by adding silt into the
Rapid River via the Torpid Aqueduct, which diverts water from
the Torpid River to the Rapid River. Id.
The State of New Union sought leave from the district court
to intervene in the suit "as a matter of right" pursuant to 33
2005] 437
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U.S.C. § 1365(c). R. at 4. The court granted the motion over the
opposition of both parties. Id. Capital City moved for summary
judgment, and the court granted the motion on three separate
grounds. R. at 4-5. First, FSSC failed to provide proper notice as
required under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b), and thus the court lacked ju-
risdiction over the case. Second, Capitol City does not violate
§ 1311(a) by its diversion of the Torpid River. Finally, the Act
does not apply to the diversion of the Torpid River because New
Union granted a permit to Capitol City for the diversion and the
State controls water ownership, use, and application.
FSSC and Capitol City appeal the grant of New Union's mo-
tion to intervene. FSSC appeals the decision to grant summary
judgment on each of the three grounds. New Union appeals the
grant of summary judgment as to the sufficiency of FSSC's notice.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Capitol City is the largest city in the state of New Union and
is located on the dry, south slope of the Front Mountains. For
many years, Capitol City has required a continuous water acquisi-
tion program to serve the water supply needs of its citizens and
businesses, with much of this needed water coming from the wet-
ter, north slope of the Front Mountains. R. at 3.
Over the years, Capitol City has acquired the legal rights to
the total flow of the Torpid River, located on the north slope of the
mountains, and for the past ten years, has been constructing the
Torpid Aqueduct. In 2002, the city acquired a diversion permit
from the state Water Engineer, in compliance with New Union's
complex statutory structure governing the allocation of water
within the state. R. at 4. On August 15, 2003, a diversion of
water from the Torpid River to the Rapid River began. R. at 3. As
a result of this diversion, water now flows from the Torpid River,
through the aqueduct, and into the Rapid River, which flows into
the Rapid Reservoir. The city currently uses all the water in the
reservoir, effectively ending the flow of the river at that point. R.
at 4.
The Torpid River and Rapid River differ somewhat with re-
spect to water quality. The Torpid River, at the point of diversion,
is a relatively slow-moving river that accumulates a substantial
amount of silt from adjacent farms and scrubland. R. at 4. The
Rapid River, on the other hand, is a fast-moving, cold, and clear
river from its headwaters at the top of the Front Mountains to its
effective endpoint at the Rapid Reservoir Id. The diversion of
438 [Vol. 22
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water from the Torpid River to the Rapid River, therefore, in-
cludes movement of silt into the Rapid River that was not previ-
ously present. Id.
The Rapid River serves as a habitat for the South Slope Cut-
throat, a species of trout indigenous to the state of New Union, a
habitat that also includes three other river basins in the state. R.
at 15. The Cutthroat continues to reside between the headwaters
of the Rapid River and the point at which the diverted water from
the Torpid River enters the river. Below that point, however, Ap-
pellants allege that the trout no longer exist because of the in-
creased turbidity from the diversion of silt-laden waters from the
Torpid River. R. at 4. Several New Union citizens enjoy recrea-
tional fly-fishing for the Cutthroat in the Rapid River, and these
citizens follow a catch and release practice and do not consume,
sell, or otherwise use the fish they catch. Id. These citizens claim
that they are now unable to fish for the Cutthroat in a location
that is convenient to their homes, and must travel somewhat fur-
ther to fish for this species of trout. Id.
The flows of the Rapid and Torpid Rivers constitute a full
twenty-five percent of Capitol City's water supply. R. at 15. The
New Union Fish and Game Department has determined that "to
remove such a great percent of [Capitol City's] water supply would
be an intolerable economic burden and a danger to its public
health." Id. The position of the State of New Union is that in this
situation, where this water supply is needed for the survival of the
people of Capitol City, the interests of these citizens should trump
concerns about the interests of the Cutthroat. Id. The state has
made the decision to allow this diversion, despite its awareness of
the potential threat to the habitat of the Cutthroat. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The ruling of the United States District Court for the District
of New Union that granted New Union's motion to intervene
should be reversed. The district court erred in concluding that the
Act treats States as the equivalents of the federal government for
the purpose of intervention. The statute clearly permits the Ad-
ministrator of the EPA to intervene in a citizen suit as a matter of
right, but the absence of any clearly expressed right of interven-
tion for States indicates, as a basic matter of statutory interpreta-
tion, that the States have no such right. This position is only
bolstered by the structure of both the Act as a whole and the citi-
zen suit provision specifically, and evidence of rights afforded to
2005] 439
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the States in other sections of the statute are not sufficient to
overcome the conclusion dictated by the Act's text and structure.
The ruling of the district court granting Capitol City's motion
for summary judgment on the grounds that FSSC provided insuf-
ficient notice of its intent to sue should be affirmed in its entirety.
The CWA requires a citizen to give notice in accordance with the
Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder. If the notice
does not comply with these requirements then the court cannot
exercise jurisdiction. Plaintiffs notice was inadequate. It failed to
provide information regarding the standard, limitation, or order
that Capitol City allegedly violated. It also did not include the
proper contact information for the plaintiffs. Finally, the notice
did not include the dates of all the alleged violations. As a result
of the first two inadequacies, the court may not exercise jurisdic-
tion over any of plaintiffs claims. Because of the third deficiency,
the court lacks jurisdiction over the alleged violations for which no
dates were provided.
The district court's ruling granting Capitol City's motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that the city's diversion of
water from the Torpid River to the Rapid River without a permit
did not constitute a violation of the Clean Water Act should be
affirmed. First, the Clean Water Act and Congress' authority
under the Commerce Clause do not extend to regulation of this
diversion of water because the Rapid River is not a "navigable
water." Congress lacks the power under the Commerce Clause to
regulate activities that do not have a "substantial effect" on inter-
state commerce. Because the displacement of the Cutthroat from
a portion of the Rapid River does not have such a "substantial im-
pact," Congress' power does not extend to regulate this diversion
of water. At a minimum, there are two possible interpretations of
the statutory language in this case, and an interpretation of the
statutory language that includes the Rapid River pushes the
boundaries of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. Ab-
sent a clear indication from Congress that it intended to push the
boundaries of its power under the Constitution, the Court should
follow the less constitutionally problematic interpretation and ex-
clude the Rapid River from regulation under the Clean Water Act.
The district court's ruling granting Capitol City's motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that New Union's granting of
a permit for this diversion as part of the state's water allocation
program obviated application of the federal Clean Water Act
should be affirmed.The Clean Water Act by its terms regulates
440 [Vol. 22
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only the "addition" of pollutants from a point source, and the di-
version of silt-laden water from one navigable water to another
does not constitute an "addition" of a pollutant. The plain lan-
guage of the Act indicates that Congress contemplated only one
body of "navigable waters," and the movement of water from one
part of the "navigable waters" to another does not constitute an
"addition" and is not subject to regulation under the Act.
This interpretation of the statutory language is dictated by
Congress' statement of purpose, which expresses its intent that
the right to allocate and manage water supplies within their juris-
dictions not be limited by application of the Act. The language of
33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) reaffirms this right. The requirement that
every diversion such as this one receive a permit under the Act
would be costly and likely prohibitive and would interfere with the
ability of the states to administer their own water allocation pro-
grams. Therefore, the reading of the language in the Act should
be read in accordance with Congress' expressed intent-diversions
such as this one are not an "addition" of pollutants and cannot be
regulated under the Act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a State may intervene in a citizen suit under 33
U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) is a question of statutory interpretation. Is-
sues of statutory construction are reviewed on appeal de novo.1
Boyd v. Illinois State Police, 384 F.3d 888, 896 (7th Cir. 2004).
Whether a lower court was correct to grant summary judg-
ment is also reviewed de novo. Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d
621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003). "Summary judgment is appropriate
when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
movant, there is no genuine issue of material fact precluding judg-
ment as a matter of law for the movant." Id.
1. Incidentally, the standard of review for rulings on motions to intervene as a
matter of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) is also de novo, see, e.g., Stone v. First
Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004), but that rule was not the basis for
the motion at issue here.
2005]
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ARGUMENT
I. THE CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION OF THE CLEAN WATER
ACT DOES NOT PERMIT STATES TO INTERVENE AS A
MATTER OF RIGHT.
The district court erred in granting New Union's motion to
intervene under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2), and its ruling should be
reversed. The statute's text clearly does not provide for interven-
tion by States, and the structure of the Act indicates Congress did
not intend to allow States to intervene. The district court cites to
nothing in the legislative history of the Act that suggests a con-
trary conclusion.
A. The Text of the Statute Cannot be Read to Allow
Intervention by States.
Congress passed the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et
seq., "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biologi-
cal integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
As part of its enforcement strategy for the CWA, Congress has
granted citizens the right to file civil actions for violations of the
Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a); see Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout
Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 488 (2d Cir.
2000). These "citizen suits" may be brought against any person,
including governmental instrumentalities and the Administrator
of the EPA,2 so long as certain conditions are met. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365.
Congress has expressly authorized the Administrator to "in-
tervene as a matter of right" in a citizen suit. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(c)(2). 3 In contrast, the statute makes absolutely no men-
tion of a similar right vested in the States. Nevertheless, the dis-
trict court below read such a right into the statute. R. at 5. It
erred in doing so.
In any question of statutory interpretation, one must begin
with the plain language of the statute. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos
Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) (citing Demarest v. Man-
2. The Administrator of the EPA is called "Administrator." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d).
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c) provides, in part:
(1) Any action respecting a violation by a discharge source of an effluent
standard or limitation or an order respecting such standard or limita-
tion may be brought under this section only in the judicial district in
which such source is located.
(2) In such action under this section, the Administrator, if not a party,
may intervene as a matter of right.
442 [Vol. 22
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speaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991)). The language of 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(c)(2) permits the Administrator alone to intervene in citi-
zen suits. While the statute states explicitly that the Administra-
tor may intervene in such suits, one searches in vain for any
reference at all to "State," a term defined by the statute. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(3). Thus, applying the presumption that "a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it
says," a court would be justified in ending the inquiry at this
point. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54
(1992). Indeed, the Court has stated that "when a statute speaks
with clarity to an issue[,] judicial inquiry into the statute's mean-
ing, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished."
Estate of Cowart, 505 U.S. at 475 (citing Demarest, 498 U.S. at
190). The statute at issue here could hardly speak more clearly.
Its text leads only to the conclusion that Congress has not given to
the States the authority to intervene as a matter of right. The
district court erred by granting the States this authority that Con-
gress declined to give them.
B. The Structure of the Act Mandates a Conclusion that
Only the United States May Intervene as a Matter of
Right.
The district court suggests that the failure of Congress to pro-
vide in 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) that States may intervene as a mat-
ter of right is a product of the length and complexity of the Act,
but courts have recognized that a complex statutory scheme indi-
cates instead that the Act impliedly precludes that which is not
provided for in the Act. In Aminoil U. S. A., Inc. v. California
State Water Res. Control Bd., 674 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1982), the
Ninth Circuit ruled that a California state court did not have ju-
risdiction under the CWA to join the Administrator as a party. It
noted that the Act provides for jurisdiction over actions against
the Administrator in federal court but makes no mention of state
court remedies. Id. at 1235. It concluded that "[a]lthough the Act
does not expressly provide that these remedies against the EPA
and the Administrator are exclusive, when interpreting a statute
as detailed as the [CWA], the remedies provided are presumed to
be exclusive absent clear contrary evidence of legislative intent."
Id. (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passen-
gers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974)). A similar presumption of exclu-
siveness is required regarding intervention. The CWA provides a
right of intervention in at least 3 circumstances, see 33 U.S.C.
44320051
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§§ 1283(e), 1365(b)(1)(B), 1365(c)(2), but nowhere does it permit
the States to intervene. This is not, as the district court states, a
"happenstance of statutory drafting," R. at 5 (quoting North and
South Rivers Watershed Assn. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552,
556 (1st Cir. 1992). Given the extensive nature of the Act, its
prominence, and its age, one must presume that Congress in-
tended to afford the right to intervene to only those parties speci-
fied in the Act, and the States are not among those specified
parties.
Further evidence that the right of intervention in citizen suits
is provided only to the Administrator is found in the fact that "Ad-
ministrator" is mentioned in conjunction with "State" in three
paragraphs of section 1365, but "State" is nevertheless excluded
from the intervention provision. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1),
1365(b)(1), 1365(e). "[Where] Congress includes particular lan-
guage in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts inten-
tionally ... in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983)) (quoting United States v. Wong
Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)). This demonstrates
that Congress was willing to treat States as equal to the Adminis-
trator where it deemed fit but specifically declined to do so in the
case of intervention. 4
If Congress had wanted to permit States to intervene in citi-
zen suits it could have provided for that expressly. It did not do
so. Neither the text of the statute nor its structure suggest any
intent on the part of Congress to allow States to intervene under
33 U.S.C. § 1365. Therefore, the decision of the district court
granting New Union's motion to intervene should be reversed.
II. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUIT
BECAUSE THE NOTICE PROVIDED BY FSSC WAS
INADEQUATE.
Because FSSC failed to give adequate "notice of the alleged
violation" as required by the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A), the
lower court correctly ruled that it lacks jurisdiction over the case
and therefore properly granted summary judgment to Capitol
City.
4. The sections cited by the district court only further support this conclusion.
R. at 5. It is noteworthy that the court points to nothing in the legislative history to
bolster its position.
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Although Congress has given citizens a significant role in the
enforcement of the CWA, citizens must fulfill certain requirements
before stepping into that role. For example, the Act contains a
notice provision which requires a prospective citizen plaintiff, at
least 60 days before bringing an action under the Act, to give "no-
tice of the alleged violation" to the alleged violator, as well as the
EPA and the state in which the alleged violation is occurring. 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b).
The Supreme Court has ruled that the notice provision is ju-
risdictional and is a "mandatory condition[] precedent to com-
mencing [a citizen] suit." Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493
U.S. 20, 31 (1989). 5 In Hallstrom, the Court stated that Congress
included the notice requirement "to strike a balance between en-
couraging citizen enforcement of environmental regulations and
avoiding burdening the federal courts with excessive numbers of
citizen suits." Id. at 29. Notice (with the accompanying 60-day
delay) furthers this goal in two ways. First, notifying the EPA
and the State of the alleged violation affords those entities an op-
portunity "to take responsibility for enforcing environmental regu-
lations, thus obviating the need for citizen suits." Id. (citing
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484
U.S. 49, 60 (1987)). In addition, notice allows the alleged offender
to take steps to "'bring itself into compliance with the Act,'" ren-
dering a citizen suit unnecessary. Id. (quoting Gwaltney, 484 U.S.
at 60). Thus, a district court is not free to disregard a failure to
provide adequate notice; rather, it must dismiss the suit if the no-
tice requirements are not met. Id. at 20.
The Act mandates that the precise requirements of notice are
to be set by the EPA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). Pursuant to that
delegation, the EPA has promulgated the following:
Notice regarding an alleged violation of an effluent standard or
limitation or of an order with respect thereto, shall include suffi-
cient information to permit the recipient to identify the specific
standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated, the
activity alleged to constitute a violation, the person or persons
5. Although the Court in Hallstrom was interpreting the citizen suit provision of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972, the Court noted its
similarity to the citizen suit provision of the CWA, see Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 23 n.1,
and lower courts have applied the holding of that case to cases involving the CWA
since both citizen suit provisions were modeled after § 304 of the Clean Air Amend-
ments, 42 U.S.C. § 7604. See Washington Trout v. McCain Foods, 45 F.3d 1351, 1353
n.3 (9th Cir. 1995).
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responsible for the alleged violation, the location of the alleged
violation, the date or dates of such violation, and the full name,
address, and telephone number of the person giving notice. 40
C.F.R. § 135.3 (the "Notice Regulation").
By this standard, the notice provided by FSSC is sorely inade-
quate. FSSC failed to include in its notice several elements re-
quired by the Notice Regulation. The letter sent by FSSC to
Capitol City lacked "sufficient information to permit the recipient
to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to
have been violated," and also did not include information on the
actual paintiffs such that FSSC cannot be said to have provided
"the full name, address, and telephone number of the person giv-
ing notice." Id. (emphasis added). Either of these reasons alone is
sufficient to warrant the grant of summary judgment as to the
entire claim. However, FSSC also alleged violations in its com-
plaint that were not included in its notice letter, namely those al-
leged to have occurred subsequent to June 1, 2004. Thus, each
violation alleged to have occurred after June 1 must be dismissed
because FSSC did not give notice of "the date or dates of such vio-
lation." Id. The absence of each of these elements renders FSSC's
notice incapable of furthering the goals of Congress and therefore
inadequate.
A. FSSC's Notice Letter Is Inadequate Because It Does Not
Provide Sufficient Information Regarding the Specific
Standard, Limitation, or Order Alleged to Have Been
Violated
The court lacks jurisdiction under Hallstrom because FSSC
did not provide sufficient information in its notice letter to specify
the standard, limitation, or order that FSSC would claim in its
complaint that Capitol City has violated. FSSC's notice letter re-
fers to a pollutant that is scarcely mentioned in the relevant por-
tions of the Code of Federal Regulations. Moreover, the pollutant
that was eventually identified in the complaint is not the pollu-
tant included in the notice letter. Congress intended for notice let-
ters to reduce the number of citizen suits by giving the recipients
time to act on the information in the notice, but because FSSC
alleged in its complaint a wholly different pollutant than it in-
cluded in its notice letter, and because the pollutant listed in the
notice letter provides little guidance to its recipients, the letter
fails to further that objective.
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In its notice letter, FSSC states that Capitol City "has vio-
lated § 1311(a)... by discharging silt-laden water from the Torpid
River Aqueduct into the Rapid River." R. at 11. However, no-
where in the subchapter of the Code of Federal Regulations dedi-
cated to "Effluent Guidelines and Standards" ("Subchapter N") is
there any standard, limitation, or order involving silt-laden wa-
ters. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 401-471. In fact, a survey of those sections
reveals only two references to "silt." See 40 C.F.R. §§ 435.11,
435.41. Unfortunately for FSSC, those references are limited to
examples of the "size and texture" of "drill cuttings", see id., and in
no way give insight into the standard, limitation, or order that is
allegedly violated.
Including sufficient information in the notice letter to inform
the recipient of the relevant regulation violated is crucial. In
Fried v. SunGard Recovery Servs., 900 F. Supp. 758, 765 (E.D.
Penn. 1995), the court ruled that the plaintiffs notice letter was
adequate under the citizen suit provision of the Clear Air Act, but
only because the language of the letter pointed to a specific provi-
sion of the Code of Federal Regulations. Similarly, in Frilling v.
Village of Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821, 834 (S.D. Ohio 1996), the court
held plaintiffs' notice regarding discharge of wastewater to be in-
adequate for "lack of clarity," noting that "[alt no point in the No-
tice Letter do Plaintiffs refer to . . . 40 C.F.R. § 403.5(a)(1) and
§ 403.5(b)(4), upon which Count Twelve is based." Id. at 831. In
this case, FSSC fails in its notice letter to even refer to a pollutant
discussed in substance in Subchapter N, let alone point to a spe-
cific provision of the Code. To allow such notice to stand as ade-
quate sets a dangerous precedent and could make it impossible for
alleged violators and governing agencies to determine the nature
of the alleged violation in time to avoid a citizen suit, defeating the
intent of Congress.
In contrast to its notice letter, FSSC alleged in its complaint
that Capitol City added suspended and settleable solids to the
Rapid River. The use of these terms in the complaint highlights
the lack of guidance provided by the notice letter as to the stan-
dard alleged to be violated. "Suspended solids" appears eighty-
four times in Subchapter N and "settleable solids" appears an ad-
ditional eleven times. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 401-471. A potential de-
fendant would have a reasonably solid foundation from which to
work if provided with such information in a notice letter. How-
ever, Capitol City was given no such direction by FSSC's notice
letter.
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It is not enough for FSSC to argue that "silt" is similar to
"suspended solids" and should be considered equivalent for notice
purposes. The Supreme Court in Hallstrom rejected a similar ar-
gument. In that case, plaintiffs gave notice to the alleged offender
but not to the EPA and the State, thus depriving those parties of
the 60-day notice period. Plaintiffs proposed that the Court stay
the proceedings as the "functional equivalent of a precommence-
ment delay." 493 U.S. at 26. Although the litigation was over
seven years old at that point, the Court refused to accept this
equivalence rationale and dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdic-
tion. Likewise, in the present case, it not sufficient for FSSC to
provide information regarding a standard similar to that on which
they plan to bring their claim in the hope that Capitol City will
divine its intentions.
Given the discrepancy between FSSC's notice letter and its
complaint, to rule that its letter is adequate would be to ignore the
purpose of the statute. In enacting section 1365(b), Congress
sought to decrease the number of citizen suits by affording the
government an opportunity to displace the citizen plaintiff and of-
fering the alleged offender time to come into compliance or reach a
settlement. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 29. Given the short window of
time in which to act, in order to accomplish this objective the no-
tice must be sufficient to enable the government and the alleged
violator to identify the alleged violation immediately. One court
described the need for specificity aptly:
When the notice is precise, sixty days is none too much time for
an agency to resolve on a course of action and take necessary
steps whether to settle the matter or bring an enforcement ac-
tion. But if the notice is imprecise, and requires the agency to
develop on its own what the scope of the alleged violations are,
then it becomes entirely impractical for the notice provision to
fulfill its purpose in such a short time period." California
Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. City of W. Sacramento, 905 F.
Supp. 792, 799 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
FSSC's notice letter can only be described as imprecise. While it
would be difficult enough for Capitol City to connect the dots be-
tween FSSC's notice and its complaint in sufficient time to take
action to stave off a lawsuit, it would be a Herculean task for the
EPA and state agencies to do so. Therefore, FSSC has not pro-
vided sufficient information to Capitol City to specify the standard
allegedly violated and judgment must be entered for Capitol City.
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For notice to be adequate it must indicate specifically what
standard the plaintiff alleges has been violated, not simply "gener-
ally orient[] the agency or violator as to the type of violation." Id.
In California Sportfishing the court ruled that a portion of the
plaintiffs notice was sufficient, but the part that was ruled ade-
quate specifically alleged violations of limits on "coliform, chlo-
rine, biochemical oxygen demand, and total suspended solids," id.
at 799, and those same pollutants were included in the complaint.
In addition, each of those pollutants is discussed pervasively in
Subchapter N. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 401-471. Thus, the alleged viola-
tor and government in that case were not required to "to develop
on [their] own" the scope of the alleged violation. 905 F. Supp. at
799. In contrast, FSSC's notice letter is not clear at all and re-
quires Capitol City and the responsible agencies to conduct their
own investigations to determine what standards regarding "silt" it
might have violated, thus rendering the notice incapable of
achieving one of the objectives for which it was designed.
Other jurisdictions have also concluded that a plaintiff must
state with precision in its notice letter the specific pollutant that
will be included in the complaint, which FSSC clearly did not do.
The Second Circuit has held that "EPA regulations require a po-
tential plaintiff to include in [a notice letter] each separate pollu-
tant that will be alleged in a subsequent complaint as the basis of
a violation of the Act." Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Un-
limited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 487 (2d Cir. 2000).
In Catskill, the City of New York ("New York") diverted water
from a reservoir into Esopus Creek without a permit. Plaintiff
gave notice to New York of its intent to sue, alleging that the city
discharged "pollutants in the form of Total Suspended Solids and
Settleable Solids into the Esopus Creek." Id. at 486. In its com-
plaint, plaintiff reiterated its claim that New York discharged
"suspended solids" into the creek and also alleged that it dis-
charged "turbidity." The court ruled that the notice of "suspended
solids" was adequate for the turbidity charge, but it did so because
turbidity is by definition water containing suspended solids. Id. at
488. The same, of course, cannot be said in this case. FSSC com-
plained that Capitol City discharges suspended solids, which are
not by definition silt. Therefore, FSSC did not "include the pollu-
tant alleged to be the basis of a violation subsequently alleged in
the complaint," id. at 487, and its notice letter is insufficient.
Although the language of some cases suggests a more liberal
approach should be applied when judging the adequacy of notice
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letters, these cases ignore the fact that a fundamental purpose of
the notice provision is to inform the governmental agency of the
allege violation. For example, in Atlantic States Legal Found. v.
Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 1997), plaintiff sent
a notice letter to Stroh alleging that Stroh had been discharging
wastewater from its die casting process into the sewer without a
valid permit. The court ruled that the notice was sufficient, hold-
ing only that "notice must be sufficiently specific to inform the al-
leged violator about what it is doing wrong." Id. at 819. The
Ninth Circuit has also adopted a loose standard, holding that the
violations listed in the complaint need only be "sufficiently simi-
lar" to those in the notice letter for notice to be adequate. Cmty.
Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d
943, 952 (9th Cir. 2002). But these courts considered only the ade-
quacy of notice as it relates to alleged violators. In explaining the
rationale behind its holding, the Atlantic States court stated that
"[the key to notice is to give the accused company the opportunity
to correct the problem." 116 F.3d at 820 (emphasis added). Like-
wise, the Bosma court focused on enabling alleged violators to
bring themselves into compliance. 305 F.3d at 951. Of course, the
reasoning of these cases gives short shrift to Congress' efforts to
avoid citizen suits by providing the government with notice.
Merely informing the alleged violator "about what it is doing
wrong" will not provide governmental agencies with sufficient in-
formation to identify the alleged violation, and thus this case
should not be adopted as a correct statement of the law.6 By fail-
ing to consider all recipients of the notice, these courts impede
Congress' efforts to limit citizen suits. In contrast, the district
court's decision furthers the goals of Congress and should be
affirmed.
B. FSSC Failed To Give Sufficient Notice Because It Did Not
Properly Identify the Prospective Plaintiffs.
The district court ruled correctly when it granted summary
judgment for Capitol City on the ground that the notice given by
FSSC did not identify the citizen plaintiff in accordance with the
6. In addition, the court suggests that its ruling was based in part on actions
Stroh took after the complaint was filed, which suggested that Stroh understood what
violation the notice letter alleged. Although this notice-in-fact argument finds no ba-
sis in Hallstrom, it is in any case not applicable here since Capitol City has done
nothing to indicate that it understood what standard FSSC was alleging in its notice
letter.
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notice requirements. Because FSSC did not provide Capitol City
with the names of the real plaintiffs in the case, its notice did not
comply with the Notice Regulation, and the district court there-
fore lacks jurisdiction. Accordingly, summary judgment for Capi-
tol City was proper.
In this case, it is Nelson Spinner and Newton Creel who claim
injury, namely by having the areas in which they can fish for trout
reduced. Because Spinner and Creel are unable to fish, they are
the parties who have suffered injury, and they are thus the real
plaintiffs. See United States ex rel. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gam-
bler's Supply, 925 F. Supp. 658, 667-68 (D. S.D. 1996) (concluding
that government is real plaintiff in a true qui tam suit (as distin-
guished from CWA citizen suits) because the injury is to the gov-
ernment); Langner v. Brown, 913 F. Supp. 260, 264 (S.D. N.Y
1996) (ruling the corporation suffers the injury in a derivative suit
and is thus the real plaintiff) (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S.
531, 538 (1970)). However, they are not the plaintiffs in this case;
instead, FSSC sues on their behalf. R. at 3. Although this is ade-
quate for standing purposes, see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000), it cre-
ates a fatal jurisdictional flaw for the court as it relates to notice.
One of the purposes of notice is to permit the "alleged violator
to head off a citizen suit by negotiated settlement." California
Sportfishing, 905 F. Supp. at 798. To this end, the notice letter
must include "the full name, address, and telephone number of
the person giving notice." 7 40 C.F.R. § 135.3. If the plaintiff is not
listed in the notice, the alleged violator cannot contact the plain-
tiff in order to negotiate a settlement, and this purpose is de-
feated. In this case, that is exactly what has occurred. The notice
letter did not provide the plaintiffs' "full name [s], address [es], and
telephone number[sl." Id. Capitol City is therefore unable to con-
tact the injured parties in an effort to reach a settlement. There-
fore, this notice cannot be deemed sufficient.
7. Although the regulation refers to "person giving notice," the language of the
statute makes clear that this person is the plaintiff. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A)
("No action may be commenced... prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given
notice ...").
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C. Notice Was Deficient as to Violations Alleged to Have
Occurred After June 1, 2004, Because Plaintiff Made No
Mention of Such Violations in Its Letter.
Plaintiff did not give adequate notice of its claims regarding
alleged violations subsequent to June 1, 2004. Indeed, its notice
letter made no mention of violations occurring after that date.
Regulations require that notice include "the date or dates" of an
alleged violation of an effluent standard. 40 C.F.R. § 135.3. Be-
cause FSSC has not complied with the regulations as to violations
alleged in its complaint to have occurred after June 1, the court
was correct to grant summary judgment for Capitol City on that
ground.
FSSC's notice letter states that "Capitol City has violated
.§ 1311(a) each and every day from August 15, 2003 until the date
of this notice [June 1, 2004.]" R. at 11. (emphasis added). The
notice expressly sets an end date to the dates of alleged violations.
It includes no references to dates after June 1, 2004. By a plain
reading of the text FSSC has not met the requirements of 40
C.F.R. § 135.3. Therefore, it was proper for the court to grant
summary judgment on violations alleged to have occurred after
the last date for which FSSC gave notice.
Although language in some cases suggests that notice is ade-
quate for violations occurring after the date of the notice letter if
the violations are of the same nature as those alleged before the
date of the notice letter, those cases are inapposite. For example,
the court in Public Interest Research Group v. Hercules, Inc. stated
that "as long as a post-complaint discharge violation is of the same
type as a violation included in the notice letter (same parameter,
same outfall), no new 60-day notice letter is necessary to include
these violations in the suit." 50 F.3d 1239, 1250 (3d Cir. 1995); see
also California Sportfishing, 905 F. Supp. at 800. However, in
those cases the notice given for pre-notice violations was ruled to
be adequate. In contrast, the alleged violations in FSSC's notice
are not clearly defined (e.g. they include no parameters.) There-
fore, the range of violations that could be considered "of the same
nature" as the pre-notice violations in this case is much too broad.
To allow the inclusion of alleged violations after June 1 would only
open the door to abuse of the citizen suit provision by plaintiffs
and increase confusion for both the alleged violators and govern-
ment agencies. Consequently, the court should affirm the grant of
summary judgment for Capitol City as to violations alleged after
June 1, 2004.
452 [Vol. 22
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/6
GEORGETOWN LAW CENTER BRIEF
III. CAPITOL CITY DID NOT VIOLATE THE CLEAN
WATER ACT'S PROHIBITION AGAINST "THE
DISCHARGE OF ANY POLL UTANT" WITHOUT A
PERMIT OR IN VIOLATION OF A PERMIT.
The lower court was correct in holding that Capitol City has
not violated the Clean Water Act's prohibition against "the dis-
charge of any pollutant" without a permit. The Act provides, in
part, that "the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful" unless it is in compliance with other provisions of the
Act, including the permitting program. 33 U.S.C. § 1331(a)
(2004). The Clean Water Act's jurisdiction over waters hinges on
the meaning of "discharge of pollutants," defined in the statute to
be "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). Although the statute defines
"navigable waters" to mean "waters of the United States," 33
U.S.C. § 1362(7), this requirement of navigability is still signifi-
cant, and Rapid River is not a "navigable water," under the mean-
ing of the statute.
The Clean Water Act only governs "navigable waters," and the
Rapid River is not a "navigable water" within the meaning of the
statute; therefore, the statute cannot be construed to cover this
water. First, Congress' power under the Commerce Clause does
not reach non-navigable waters like Rapid River. Second, even if
it were within Congress' power to regulate this water, this regula-
tion would push the limits of that power. From the language in
the statute, there is insufficient evidence to indicate that Congress
intended to reach waters such as this one, and the statute should
not be read to push the limits of Congress' power absent evidence
of a clear intent that it be read this way.
A. Congress' Authority Under the Commerce Clause Does Not
Extend To Allow It To Regulate This Water.
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution is the source of
Congress' power to regulate "navigable waters" under the Clean
Water Act, but this power does not extend to non-navigable, intra-
state waters such as the Rapid River. Article I, section 8 of the
United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall have the
power ... to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several states." This power was first defined in Gibbons v.
Ogden, where the Supreme Court recognized Congress' power to
"prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed." 22 U.S.
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1, 9 (1824). The Gibbons court noted, however, that there were
limitations to this power inherent in the language of the Constitu-
tion. The Court explained:
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that com-
merce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between
man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same
State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such
a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
Id. at 194.
This power has been construed to allow Congress to regulate only
three main categories of activity: 1) the use of the channels of in-
terstate commerce; 2) the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and 3)
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). Because the
Rapid River is neither a channel nor an instrumentality of inter-
state commerce, any regulation of this water must derive from
Congress' power over the third category, activities having a sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce.
Several decisions of the Supreme Court over the last decade
have refined and limited this definition of Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez, the Court struck
down a statute prohibiting students from carrying guns in schools,
finding that this regulation of a non-economic activity with only a
tangential effect on interstate commerce exceeded Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause. 514 U.S. at 567. The Court
also established that for a regulated activity to fall under the third
category of the Commerce Clause power, it must have a "substan-
tial effect" on interstate commerce. Id. at 559.
The Court reaffirmed this limit on the Commerce Clause
power in United States v. Morrison, five years after Lopez. 529
U.S. 598 (2000). There, the court struck down the Violence
Against Women Act, holding that this statute exceeded Congress'
power because it was regulating a non-economic activity that had
only an attenuated effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 617. In
Morrison, the Court was particularly concerned that Congress
was attempting to regulate intrastate violence, something that
"has always been the province of the States." Id. at 618.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in the context of the
Clean Water Act in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v.
United States. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). In that case, the Court struck
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down regulation of an intrastate body of water, holding that where
the only tie between the water and interstate commerce was the
presence of migratory birds, its regulation under the Commerce
Clause power raised serious constitutional questions. Id. at 173.
However, the Court did not reach this constitutional question,
resolving the case on the grounds that this water did not fall
within the definition of a "navigable water." Id. at 474. Even ac-
knowledging evidence of an expansive, multi-million dollar indus-
try surrounding recreational pursuits relating to migratory birds,
the Court maintained that this application of the Commerce
Clause power was constitutionally questionable. Id. at 173.
Similarly, in this case, Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause does not extend to cover regulation of an intrastate diver-
sion of water with only an attenuated connection to interstate
commerce. Although this diversion of water is, arguably, an eco-
nomic activity, unlike the activities being regulated in Lopez and
Morrison, the attenuated connection to interstate commerce is
similar. The only possible effect that the diversion of water from
the Torpid River to the Rapid River could have on interstate com-
merce is the loss of fishing capabilities in one section of the Rapid
River. As the court below noted, the South Slope Cutthroat, a spe-
cies of trout, has allegedly been displaced from a portion of the
river below the diversion point. These trout are still present in
the headwaters of the river and two adjacent streams, however.
R. at 4. They can also be found in the nearby Trout, Blue, and
Clear Rivers and their tributaries. R. at 13. Furthermore, the
only even arguably economic use of these fish that was made
before the diversion was occasional recreational, catch-and-re-
lease fly fishing. R. at 13, 14. Even now, after the elimination of
trout from this particular stretch of the Rapid River, these trout
can still be found and fished in several other areas. R. at 13.
Just as the various recreational uses for migratory birds in
SWANCC were a questionable link to interstate commerce, possi-
bly failing to provide constitutional support for federal regulation,
these trout-fishing activities do not substantially affect interstate
commerce and cannot form the basis for regulation of the Rapid
River under the Clean Water Act. Even in the aggregate, this
kind of recreational fishing could have little or no effect on inter-
state commerce.8 No evidence has been provided to indicate that
8. Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In that case, the Supreme Court
held that the private, small-scale wheat production of a farmer for his own home con-
sumption could, in the aggregate, affect demand for the commercial wheat market
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people travel from outside the state to fish this river, possible evi-
dence of an effect on interstate commerce that was even available
in SWANCC. This is a species of trout that is indigenous to New
Union, lives only within New Union, and has an effect only on a
small group of people within New Union. R. at 15. It has even less
of an effect on interstate commerce than the migratory birds did in
SWANCC. This certainly fails to rise to the level of a "substantial
effect" on interstate commerce, and, therefore, Congress does not
have the power to regulate this body of water under the Com-
merce Clause.
B. Under the Language of the Statute, the Rapid River Is Not
a "Navigable Water," Nor Is It a Tributary of a
"Navigable Water," So It Cannot Be Regulated.
The application of the Clean Water Act to the Rapid River, at
a minimum, raises strong questions of constitutionality; absent a
clear indication of Congress' intent to regulate intrastate waters
such as this one, the language of the statute should not be con-
strued to do so. The Supreme Court has held that where interpre-
tations of statutory language push the outer limits of Congress'
authority, a "clear indication that Congress intended that result"
is required. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172. The Court also recently
reaffirmed the principle that when a statute can be construed in
two ways, one of which raises serious constitutional issues and the
other of which does not, the Court is obligated to follow the latter
reading. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000). By its
terms, the Clean Water Act applies to "navigable waters," and the
Rapid River does not fall within this definition. Therefore, the Act
should not be construed to cover this water, absent any indication
that Congress intended it to reach this far.
A variety of definitions establish and refine what is consid-
ered to be a "navigable water" under the Clean Water Act. The
"discharge of pollutants," the activity regulated by the Act, is de-
and, thus, had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to justify regulation under
the Commerce Clause. Id. The recreational instances of trout fishing in this case do
not even measure up to the low standard set in Wickard-the fish are not consumed,
kept, or otherwise used by the fishers, in contrast to the wheat in Wickard, which was
used for essential needs of the farmer's home. Furthermore, the Court in Wickard
noted that home-grown wheat, in the aggregate, was a substantial factor in the na-
tional wheat market, id. at 127, while recreational fishing for the South Slope Cut-
throat cannot be said to play any significant role in fish or seafood markets, even in
the aggregate. This case fails to satisfy even this attenuated rationale for regulation
under the Commerce Clause.
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fined in the statute to be "any addition of any pollutant to naviga-
ble waters from any point source." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). The
statute defines "navigable waters" to mean "waters of the United
States." 33 U.S.C. §1362(7). EPA has defined "waters of the
United States" to include "all waters which are currently used,
were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or
foreign commerce . . .", including tributaries of waters of the
United States. 40 CFR 122.2. The factor upon which all these
definitions turn is navigability.
The Supreme Court has also contributed to our current un-
derstanding of the meaning of the phrase "navigable waters." In
The Daniel Ball v. United States, the Court held that "navigable
waters" were those that "are used, or are susceptible of being
used, in their ordinary condition, as high-ways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary
modes of trade and travel on water." 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1871).
This definition was further expanded to include waters that, with
reasonable improvement, could be made navigable. United States
v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
The Rapid River, under any of these definitions, is not a navi-
gable water. It is choked with rapids and waterfalls, so it has
never been used for navigation and cannot ever be so used. R. at
8. Furthermore, the Rapid River is not now a tributary of any
navigable water, and although it was once a tributary of a naviga-
ble river, it will never be a tributary of this water again as long as
Capitol City exists. R. at 8. These facts are not contested by Ap-
pellant. Rather, Appellant argues that by defining "navigable wa-
ters" to mean "waters of the United States," Congress was
signaling its intent that the Act cover more than just navigable
waters. However, the term "navigable" cannot be read out of the
statute simply because of its later definition. The use of this term,
at a minimum, indicates Congress' own conception of the source of
its authority to regulate, and it cannot be ignored. SWANCC, 531
U.S. at 172. As argued above, Congress' authority under the Com-
merce Clause at least arguably does not allow it to regulate intra-
state waters such as the Rapid River. The language of the statute,
referring to "navigable waters," is, at a minimum, susceptible of
two interpretations, one of which being that the statute is in-
tended to cover waters that are, in fact, navigable. Given that this
interpretation lacks the serious constitutional issues posed by any
interpretation that includes regulation of the Rapid River, this in-
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terpretation should be applied, and the Rapid River should be ex-
cluded from regulation of "navigable waters.'
Congress' power to regulate "navigable waters" under the
Clean Water Act derives from its authority under the Commerce
Clause. This authority, however, does not extend to cover non-
navigable, intrastate waters, such as the Rapid River, that have
no substantial effect on interstate commerce. At the very least,
any interpretation of the statutory language that would apply the
Clean Water Act to the Rapid River is constitutionally problem-
atic. The less constitutionally problematic interpretation, that
this statute extends to cover only navigable waters and their
tributaries, is not contrary to Congress' intent; rather, the plain
language of the statute supports this interpretation. Therefore,
this Court should apply the latter interpretation to the Act, and
hold that the Rapid River is not a "navigable water" and is not
susceptible to regulation under the Clean Water Act.
IV. NEW UNION'S GRANTING OF A PERMIT FOR
CAPITOL CITY'S DIVERSION OF THE TORPID RIVER
TO THE RAPID RIVER WAS PART OF THE STATE'S
EXERCISE OF CONTROL OVER WATER ALLOCATION
AND OBVIATES APPLICATION OF THE CLEAN WATER
ACT TO THIS DIVERSION.
Capitol City received a permit for this diversion as part of
New Union's comprehensive water allocation system. This action,
combined with the language of the Act, dictates that this diversion
of water is not an "addition" of pollutants under the Act, and
therefore should not be regulated under the Act. First, the lan-
guage of the Act indicates that Congress contemplated only one,
unitary body of navigable waters to be regulated under the Act,
and so the movement of water from one part of the "navigable wa-
ters" to another does not constitute an "addition" to be regulated.
Second, the cost of obtaining a permit under the Act for every such
diversion would be prohibitive. Finally, Congress' expressed pur-
pose in the Act indicates that particularly in cases such as this
one, where a diversion is being made as part of an overall state
water allocation program, the Act should be construed not to in-
terfere with state water allocation rights. The diversion of water
in this case, from the Torpid River to the Rapid River, should not
be regulated as an "addition" under the Act.
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A. The Diversion of Water From the Torpid River to the
Rapid River Does Not Constitute an Addition of a
Pollutant From a Point Source and Is Not, Therefore,
in Violation of the Clean Water Act.
The use of the Torpid Aqueduct to divert water from the Tor-
pid River to the Rapid River is not an "addition" of pollutants to
navigable waters. First, the language of the Clean Water Act con-
templates only one, unitary body of water that is protected. Sec-
ond, the movement of pollutants from one part of the navigable
waters to another does not constitute an "addition" of a pollutant.
1. The language of the Clean Water Act indicates that
Congress intended to regulate only one, unitary body
of "navigable waters" in the Act, so the addition of a
pollutant, silt, to navigable waters was made
through unregulatable, non-point sources.
The language of the Clean Water Act contemplates that only
one, unitary body of "navigable waters" be regulated under the
Act. The Act defines "discharge of a pollutant" to mean "any addi-
tion of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source."
33 U.S.C. §1362(12). This language notably excludes the word
"any" before the phrase "navigable waters," although it includes it
before "addition," "pollutant," and "point source," indicating that
although the statute contemplates any number of additions, pollu-
tants, and point sources, it intends to cover only one body of
water-the "navigable waters" of the United States as a whole.
The structure of the statute supports this reading of the stat-
utory language. The Act, in 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(2)(F) addresses
"pollution resulting from . . . changes in the movement, flow, or
circulation of any navigable waters or ground waters, including
changes caused by the construction of dams, levees, channels,
causeways, or flow diversion facilities." In this section, it directs
EPA to give states information on the evaluation and control of
such pollution from non-point sources. The language of this provi-
sion indicates that Congress contemplated the very situation we
face in this case, pollution caused by the redirection of navigable
waters, and considered it to be a different problem than the addi-
tion of pollutants from a point source, one which should be regu-
lated by the states. The federal regulation of discharges from
point sources, on the other hand, only applies to actual additions
of pollutants from the point source to the navigable waters of the
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United States. In this case, because the pollutant in question, silt,
entered the navigable waters of the United States from non-point
sources along the Torpid River, this addition of a pollutant would
be subject only to possible state regulation, not federal regulation.
Another provision of the Act, however, does allow states to set
up ambient water quality standards for particular waters, indicat-
ing that the Act could possibly contemplate protection of individ-
ual water bodies as well as "navigable waters" generally. 33
U.S.C. §1313(c)(2)(A). This provision provides that states may re-
vise or adopt new water quality standards, based on designated
uses such as drinking water and recreational purposes, for "the
navigable waters involved." Id. This is an optional portion of the
Act, however, and one that seems to contemplate dividing off a
subset of "navigable waters" for heightened regulation based upon
usage. The language refers to the "navigable waters involved,"
rather than referring to specific bodies of water, indicating that
Congress intended this provision to focus on parts of the overall
unitary body of "navigable waters," not to refer to individual, dis-
crete bodies of water. This provision of the Act, therefore, only
strengthens the statutory reading of the phrase "navigable wa-
ters" to mean one, unitary body of water.
The plain language and structure of the Clean Water Act indi-
cate that in the context of federal regulation of the discharge of
pollutants from point sources, Congress intended that the "navi-
gable waters of the United States" be considered to be one unitary
water. The addition of silt to "navigable waters" in this case,
therefore, occurred when silt was added to the Torpid River from
non-point sources. The Clean Water Act does not regulate the ad-
dition of pollutants from non-point sources, leaving that regula-
tion up to the states. Therefore, the addition of silt to the
navigable waters of the United States cannot be regulated under
the Clean Water Act.
2. The movement of water from one part of the "navigable
waters" to another through the Torpid Aqueduct does
not constitute an "addition" under the Clean Water
Act.
The movement of water from the Torpid River to the Rapid
River via the Torpid Aqueduct, a point source, does not constitute
an "addition" of a pollutant under the Clean Water Act, and this
diversion of water, therefore, is not subject to the Act's permitting
requirements. Although the courts of appeal and the Supreme
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Court have not spoken to the "unitary waters" interpretation of
the statutory language outlined above, a number of circuits have
held that for there to be an "addition" for the purposes of the Act,
the point source must be adding a pollutant from the outside
world. Because the Torpid Aqueduct is not adding anything new
from the outside world that was not already in the navigable wa-
ters, the movement of water through the aqueduct and into the
Rapid River does not constitute an "addition," and is not subject to
regulation under the Act.
A number of courts of appeal have recognized that movement
of waters containing a pollutant into the same waters does not
constitute an "addition" under the Act. The DC circuit, in Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, held that the language of the statute
supported EPA's contention that an "addition" occurs only when a
"the point source itself physically introduces a pollutant into
water from the outside world." 693 F.2d 156, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held in Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Con-
sumers Power Co. that there was no "addition" where a hydroelec-
tric plant withdrew water and then released it back into the same
body of water. 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988). The court there also
noted that the language used by Congress indicated that it did not
intend to regulate all pollution released through a point source,
but only pollution that was added by a point source. Id. at 586.
These cases found that the point sources involved, dams in both
cases, did not add a pollutant where they simply removed water
from a body of water and returned it to that body of water.
More recently, the Second Circuit has reaffirmed this princi-
ple in Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. New
York, holding that the reading of the word "addition" in Gorsuch
and Consumers Power was the correct one. 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir.
2001). The court noted that "if one takes a ladle of soup from a
pot, lifts it above the pot, and pours it back into the pot, one has
not "added" soup or anything else to the pot . . . in requiring a
permit for such a discharge, the EPA might as easily require a
permit for Niagara Falls." Id. at 492. In that case, however, the
court held that the waters in question were two separate bodies of
water. The court noted that the movement of water from a reser-
voir to an unrelated creek by way of a tunnel constituted an addi-
tion for the purposes of the statute. Id. at 492. The court's finding
in Catskill Mountains hinges on the its determination that the
two bodies of water were, in fact, separate. This premise is not
supported by the language of the statute, analyzed above, that in-
20051 461
31
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
dicates that the statute contemplates regulation of one, unitary
body of "navigable waters." Therefore, under this interpretation
of the statutory language, the court's holding in Catskill Moun-
tains would likely have been the opposite-that the movement of
silt-laden water from the reservoir to the creek was not an addi-
tion for the purposes of the statute. That case, like the current
one, involves only a removal of water and a re-depositing of that
same water-no more.
The pollutant in this case, silt, entered the "navigable waters"
of the United States from non-point sources along the Torpid
River, an addition that cannot be regulated under the Act. The
point source in question, the aqueduct, simply moved that water
from one part of the "navigable waters" to another, which is not an
"addition" under the Act. Therefore, this point source does not re-
quire a permit, because no "addition" of pollutants has taken
place.
B. The Costs of Requiring a Permit For Every Diversion of
Water Would Be Prohibitive, And Would Supercede or
Abrogate the Rights of the State of New Union To
Allocate Water Within its Jurisdiction and the
Rights of Capitol City to the Water That Has Been
Allocated to it Under the State Water Allocation System.
If, as Appellant suggests, the statute is read to cover diver-
sions such as this one as "additions" of pollutants, and a permit
were required under the Clean Water Act for diversions of water,
the costs of administering a comprehensive water allocation pro-
gram, such as the one in New Union, would effectively eliminate
the ability of the state to regulate allocation of waters within its
jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court noted in dicta in S. Florida
Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, if the
Act's permitting requirement is read to require a permit for every
diversion of navigable waters, "thousands of new permits might
have to be issued, particularly by western States, whose water
supply networks often rely on engineered transfers among various
natural water bodies." 124 S. Ct. 1537, 1544-45 (2004).
This is precisely the situation in the State of New Union gen-
erally, and in Capitol City specifically. Capitol City is located on
the dry south slope of the Front Mountains, and almost since its
founding, the city has relied on a water acquisition program to
serve the needs of its citizens and businesses. R. at 3. The state of
New Union has a complicated statutory structure that governs
[Vol. 22462
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/6
GEORGETOWN LAW CENTER BRIEF
this water acquisition and allocation program in which trans-ba-
sin diversions of water require a permit from the state's Water
Engineer. R. at 3-4. Capitol City has, through this elaborate state
statutory structure, secured the rights to the total flow of the Tor-
pid River and has received a diversion permit from the state's
Water Engineer in 2002. R. at 4.
If the Clean Water Act is now construed to require an NPDS
permit for every such diversion in the state, the costs of traversing
the federal permitting program would effectively eliminate the
ability of the state to administer its water allocation program-
one on which Capitol City depends for acquisition of a sufficient
water supply for its citizens. This abrogation of the state's ability
to regulate and allocate waters within its jurisdiction, as well as of
Capitol City's rights to the water allocated to it by the state, would
violate § 1251(g)'s requirement that the Act not be construed to
supercede, abrogate, or impair the states' ability to administer
their own water allocation programs.
C. The Expressed Purpose of the Clean Water Act Dictates the
Interpretation That This Diversion is Not An "Addition"
of a Pollutant and Indicates That Congress Did Not
Intend That Diversions Such As These Be
Regulated By the Act.
Even under a comprehensive federal statutory scheme de-
signed to protect the nation's waters, the right of the states to au-
thority over water allocation remains intact, and the diversion of
water in question in this case is part of a comprehensive water
allocation plan in the state of New Union. The Wallop Amend-
ment to the Clean Water Act specifies that "the authority of each
State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall
not be superceded, abrogated, or otherwise impaired by this Act"
and that "nothing in this Act shall be construed to supercede or
abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been established
by any State." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g). This provision, appearing in
the "Congressional Declaration of Goals and Policy" section of the
Clean Water Act, is a clear indication that Congress did not intend
for federal regulation of water quality to impair the traditional
power of the states to allocate and manage their own water re-
sources. The construction of the statute asserted in Section A
above, that the diversion of water from one part of "navigable wa-
ters" to another does not constitute an "addition" under the stat-
ute, is therefore not only a reasonable construction of the
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statutory language, but is actually dictated by the purposes of the
statute.
Decisions regarding allocation of water within a state have
traditionally been within the sole power of that state. Prior to the
passing of the Clean Water Act, Congress had already recognized
that water allocation decisions were within the purview of tradi-
tional state power. In the Federal Reclamation Act of 1902, codi-
fied at 43 U.S.C. § 372 et. seq., Congress recognized the obligation
of the federal government to abide by state law regarding water
allocation and rights. Later, the McCarran Amendment provided
a structure and procedure wherein parties could secure judgment
against the United States in cases regarding the adjudication of
water rights. 43 U.S.C. § 666. When Congress passed the Clean
Water Act, it was already functioning within a federal statutory
structure that acknowledged the dominance of state law with re-
spect to water allocation and water rights. The policy, codified in
§ 1251(g), simply provides additional recognition that this new
federal statute was not to be construed to interfere with this tradi-
tional state right.
The Supreme Court has held that policy declarations in fed-
eral regulations "cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of juris-
diction, even if the particular grant seems inconsistent with the
broadly expressed purpose." Connecticut Light & Power Co. v.
Fed. Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 515, 527 (1945). However, this lan-
guage regarding the policies of the Act should be read as "a guide
in resolving any ambiguity or indefiniteness in the specific provi-
sions which purport to carry out its intent." Id. at 527. As submit-
ted above in section A, the definition of the word "addition" in the
Act is at a minimum susceptible to the interpretation that it does
not include diversions of water, such as this one, within the navi-
gable waters of the United States. The "guide" provided by Con-
gress in § 1251(g), however, resolves this ambiguity clearly. The
provisions of the statute, including its definition of an "addition"
should not be read to interfere with the traditional water alloca-
tion rights of the states, and to consider diversions and allocations
of water within a state to be an "addition" of pollutants under the
statute would interfere with these rights and burden the State of
New Union's ability to carry out its water allocation plan.
The few courts who have addressed this issue have inter-
preted § 1251(g) in different ways, but a decision to regulate diver-
sions of water as an "addition" of pollutants under the Act would
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be nearly unprecedented.9 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has held that this provision provides "specific
indication ... that Congress did not want to interfere any more
than necessary with state water management.. ." National Wild-
life Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
There, the court held that a dam, which produced a number of
negative changes in water quality, including sedimentation, did
not have to be regulated under the Act's permitting program. The
EPA had argued that dams generally did not require discharge
permits but would be subject to state regulations, and the court
held that EPA's interpretation of the statute was reasonable, par-
ticularly in light of the language of § 1251(g), which indicated an
unwillingness on the part of Congress to interfere with state
water regulation schemes.
These three courts concur on one main point in their interpre-
tations of § 1251(g)-that states' rights to allocate water and the
rights of those to whom water has been allocated by the states are
to be given at least some deference in the Clean Water Act's regu-
latory scheme. In this case, both the State of New Union's right to
allocate water and the rights of Capitol City to the water that has
been allocated to it are threatened by the Appellant's assertion
that this diversion of water is an "addition" of a pollutant and re-
quires a permit under the Act. The statutory language is at a
minimum susceptible to two interpretations, and the language of
§ 1251(g) dictates that the Clean Water Act should not be inter-
preted in such a way as to impair these water allocation rights,
rights which have traditionally been the purview of the states.
Congress did not intend that the Act be construed to require
federal permitting for a traditionally state law function-the allo-
cation of water. Therefore, to the extent that there is any question
as to the meaning of the language of the statute regarding an "ad-
dition" of pollutants, this ambiguity should be resolved in light of
Congress' expressed purpose in 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g). The costs of
obtaining a permit for every such diversion in New Union would
eliminate the state's ability to administer its water allocation pro-
gram, and the regulation of this diversion would abrogate the
9. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Akers, has held that where the federal
regulation in question is aimed at "the type of legitimate purpose for which the Act
was intended," the federal government would be justified in its regulation of an activ-
ity, even if that regulation affected state-allocated water rights. 785 F.2d 814, 821
(9th Cir. 1986). However, this case involved a farmer's dredge and fill activities on a
wetland area, which is a far cry from a municipal water diversion as part of an overall
water allocation program administered by the state.
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rights of Capitol City to the water that has been allocated to it by
state law. The fact that this diversion is a permitted part of New
Union's comprehensive water allocation program, therefore, dic-
tates that it should not be held to be an "addition" of pollutants
and should not be regulated under the Act, and the district court's
grant of summary judgment on these grounds should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Capitol City respectfully requests
that the Court overturn the district court's grant of New Union's
motion to intervene by right under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2). Fur-
ther, Capitol City respectfully requests that the Court affirm the
district court's grant of summary judgment on the grounds that
the court lacked jurisdiction over the case because FSSC failed to
give proper prior notice of their intent to sue under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1)(A), that Capitol City's diversion of waters from the
Torpid River to the Rapid River does not constitute a violation of
the Clean Water Act, and that New Union's water allocation
rights supercede the application of the Clean Water Act to this
diversion.
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